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Regional Implications of the novel 
coronavirus outbreak 
By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
It is my profound hope that the current Covid-19 crisis will allow us all 
to step back and take some of the heat and anger out of the Brexit 
debate. After all, it is hard to remain angry about a political 
phenomenon – however strong one’s beliefs – when you’re concerned 
for the lives of loved ones. 
More generally, as my colleague Professor De Ruyter has previously 
commented, whilst profoundly different events, analysing Brexit can 
help us understand elements of the economic impact of the Covid-19 
outbreak. Brexit will have profound implications for regional 
economies. This much is known, with many academic papers 
examining either exposure to Brexit via trade-related channels (Chen 
et al., 2018) or looking at other aspects of its subnational impact. 
Many, including the Treasury, have used computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models to try and estimate the economic impact on 
regional GDP and employment. Although useful, such modelling is 
highly sensitive to its inputs and precise parametrisation[1]. 
Other research has looked at more disaggregated data or took a 
qualitative (or mixed methods) approach. After all, any impact will 
differ dramatically between industries with financial services 
concerned about passporting rights, the aviation industry concerned 
over membership of the European Aviation Safety Authority, media 
firms about the audio-visual media services directive and so on. 
How does this relate to the Covid-19 outbreak? Well, much as Brexit 
has profound economic implications for the nations and regions of the 
UK, so does the novel coronavirus. Often these are both interesting 
and subtle and, like Brexit, the final reckoning will depend on political 
decisions. 
The current crisis has forced employers and employees to embrace 
remote working. This is likely to enormously accelerate an existing 
trend. Many of us are using software to collaborate remotely in a way 
that would not have been possible even 5 years ago. 
It turns out that for many job roles, a permanent physical presence in 
the office is much less necessary than we previously believed. 
Concerns over employee “shirking” appear to be overblown. For many 
roles, it appears that either there are clear job outputs or effective 
employee monitoring is close to impossible in any events. 
It is clear whether outputs have been achieved or not: they are easy 
to monitor remotely, particularly when tasks are more repetitive. For 
other employees, effective monitoring is largely impossible except in 
terms of achieving longer-term goals. However, this is true even in the 
workplace – all that can be monitored is whether an employee is 
present, not the achievement of work. 
In most cases, however, people are keen to deliver. In part this is due 
to very human impulses – the desire to perform work that is valued 
and a sense in pride in what we do. More traditional “economic” 
career incentives to perform well also still apply. 
Once such barriers to change have been overcome, such 
arrangements are likely to prove sticky. Consider many of the 
profound changes that occur in the workplace during wartime. Even in 
cases where these revert to pre-war norms, there is clear pressure for 
longer-term change. 
Elements of the new normal are likely to stick. Whilst this will 
represent a profound culture change for many, its implications will 
also be profound for regional economies. For certain job roles, it is 
likely to become much less necessary to live in the same region that 
one works. 
It is (almost) impossible to live in Newcastle and commute to London 
every day. The expense is enormous and the time taken huge. It’s far 
more feasible if one can work remotely for 4 days per week. 
If this indeed occurs then it will act to remove pressure on the London 
housing market. Our own work has found that (Hearne, In prep.; 
Hearne and De Ruyter, 2019) for most income deciles any additional 
wages earned as a result of living in London are “swallowed up” by 
higher housing costs. 
If this effect unwinds even slightly as a result of remote working then 
its impact could be profound. A second factor hitherto uncommented 
on concerns so-called “agglomeration” effects. Whilst contested within 
the regional development literature (Bosker, 2007; Geppert, Gornig, & 
Werwatz, 2008; Rivera-Batiz, 1988), it has been argued that London 
and Paris benefit profoundly from such agglomeration. In London’s 
case, this is particularly true of the financial services sector. 
However, the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) dramatically illustrates 
the “diseconomies of scale” associated with major conurbations. It is 
no accident that the virus has spread most rapidly in large cities and 
urban areas. In Italy it was the wider urban area around Milan, in 
Spain the most vicious outbreak has appeared in Madrid. In both 
France and the UK, the twin metropolises of Europe – Paris and 
London – have been hit hardest. Looking across the Atlantic, we see 
New York wrestling with the same problem. 
Many of us recoiled in horror watching commuters continuing to pack 
onto the London Underground long after ‘stay at home’ became first 
strongly advised and later mandatory. This is not a question of certain 
regions being “ahead” on a curve. They are on a different trajectory 
altogether. 
There is a sense in some quarters that once this is over, everything 
will somehow return to “normal”. That ‘normal’, however, will not look 
like the old normal. Cities will not lose their lustre and most jobs 
cannot be done from home, but there are nevertheless likely to be 
profound long-term impacts from the current events. My hunch is that 
their regional ramifications will be equally fundamental and long-
lasting. 
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[1] In this regard it is not so very different from epidemiological 
models that have received such intense scrutiny during the 
ongoing Covid-19 crisis. 
 
